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sense” (97), and deals primarily with the tricky evidence of Plutarch at Moralia 1023b–c. 
Her thoughtful interpretation requires her to treat linguistic details of the passage as 
distinctly Posidonian, but she allows that Plutarch may be working through a source, in 
all likelihood Eudorus (100n21). While her conclusions are nevertheless modest, I am 
puzzled by the last sentence: “This emphasis [on mathematical reason] allowed Posidonius 
to reinterpret inherited Platonism by mathematicising it . . . ” (117), given that Speusip-
pus and Xenocrates were already mathematicized. Roberto Polito’s polished article on 
Asclepiades and Heraclides subtitled “medical Platonism?” seems more marginally relevant, 
being somewhat more interesting on fourth-century Heraclides than on Asclepiades. Since 
a basic hypothesis is “that Asclepiades appropriated themes from the tradition to which 
Heraclides belonged for the purpose of criticising or ridiculing them” (138), Asclepiades 
turns out to be somewhat anti-Platonist. 
A. A. Long tackles the Pythagorean work of Alexander Polyhistor, for which it is dif-
ficult to find any philosophic context. After some sensible and at times intriguing discus-
sion, Long comes down in favour of it being a learned literary construct. We stay partly 
with Pythagoras for Mauro Bonazzi’s article on Eudorus, “an interesting philosopher, 
who substantially contributed to the renewal of Platonism, from both an historical and a 
philosophical perspective” (160). Bonazzi weaves magic out of the evidence for Eudorus 
and key passages of Platonic, Aristotelian, and pseudo-Pythagorean sources. Sedley tackles 
Cicero’s Academically-slanted translation of the cosmogony of Timaeus, and the part that 
it was intended to play in a wider Academic construct. 
Julia Annas offers an elegant but less detailed account of the debt of Cicero’s de Legibus 
to Plato’s Laws, philosophic as well as literary. While this is not stated, it seems relevant to 
the themes of this volume that at this stage we see a Cicero still approaching Plato largely 
through the eyes of a philosophic tradition (thanks no doubt to his following Antiochus’s 
approach to philosophic history). For, as Ingo Gildenhard argues in the final article “Ci-
cero’s use of both Plato himself and his philosophical oeuvre is thus complex, comprising 
diverse modes of appropriation and engagement” (226). A key point here is that Platonic 
Forms only appear negatively in the dialogues of the 50s BC, and much more positively in 
the works of 46–44. The Plato of “heuristic fiction” (231) becomes the Plato of the Forms 
as well. This rich article concludes with a political explanation of this change. How much 
more in line with other themes in the book this would have been if Cicero had been inspired 
by the new philosophic environment to see that Plato and Aristotle were importantly in 
disagreement over Forms, and that Platonic Forms opened up important new channels in 
philosophic discourse.
This is a fine volume, but it would have benefitted from a short conclusion from the 
editor, reflecting on the differences this research has made.
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Ever since G. E. L. Owen’s well-known paper on Aristotelian logic (“Tithenai ta Phainom-
ena,” 1986), there has been a growing interest on Aristotle’s dialectical method and its 
modern interpretations. Perhaps the most important of all contributions was made in 
1997 by Paul Slomkowski with his detailed study of Topics, and in the same year by Robin 
Smith with his translation of Topics. More importantly, there were different interpretations 
of Aristotle’s Topics and dialectic among scholars such as J. D. G. Evans and P. M. Huby. In 
May Sim’s edited collection From Puzzles to Principles?: Essays on Aristotle’s Dialectic (1999), 
scholars of classical philosophy disputed whether or not Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. 
Within this context, Marta Spranzi’s The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric offers 
a comprehensive legacy of the Aristotelian dialectic while exploring the significance of the 
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art of dialectic in the development of philosophical methods of inquiry. Spranzi tries to 
reconstruct an “Aristotelian tradition” in dialectic by using Aristotle’s Topics as a source text 
for the later philosophical development of dialectic, both in form and content. Spranzi’s 
central argument is that Aristotle’s text holds the blueprint for the later development of 
two different types of dialectic: opinion-oriented disputational and truth-oriented aporetic. 
She carries out her project in seven chapters. The first chapter discusses the origin and 
definition of dialectic through a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s Topics. Chapter 2 explores 
connections between Aristotelian dialectic and the form of dialectic that emerged during 
the Renaissance. She discusses the dialectics of Cicero and Boethius within the scholastic 
tradition, and how they also influenced Renaissance dialectic. The author uses this chapter 
as a transition between Aristotle’s original context and the Italian Renaissance that she 
subsequently discusses in greater detail. Chapter 3 lays out her points regarding the three 
ways in which Renaissance dialectic followed in the Aristotelian tradition. Here, Spranzi 
notes that the Renaissance saw a revival in the Aristotelian model of dialectic, and that 
those Renaissance authors recovered what they believed to be the “real” Aristotelian view 
of dialectic. 
Spranzi represents Rudolph Agricola in chapter 4 as one of the founders of the “new 
dialectic” movement, which bridged the gap between rhetoric and dialectic and set the 
stage for a more thorough Aristotelian approach. She claims that Agricola’s theory empha-
sizes the development of “probable” arguments rather than “true” arguments. Chapter 5 
discusses Agostino Nifo, who defended Aristotle’s Topics against medieval interpretations 
by utilizing the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes. Spranzi then sets 
up her goal for the following chapters (5 and 6), discussing dialectic and its role on the 
“road to truth,” rather than winning the argumentation. 
In chapter 6, Spranzi draws our attention to the final development of the Renaissance 
period through Carlo Sigonio’s treatise De dialogo liber, published in 1562. She claims that 
Sigonio’s theory is a turn back toward the Aristotelian sense of dialectic, in its emphasis on 
dialectic as a road to truth through the testing of opinions and beliefs in disputation. The 
seventh and final chapter begins with a discussion of the relative abandonment of dialectic 
during the Scientific Revolution due to the search for a reliable scientific method. Spranzi 
then moves the discussion forward into modern times and points out the works of more 
recent theorists including Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, Van Eemeren, James Free-
man, and Douglas Walton. She discusses whether or not their approaches position them 
in the Aristotelian tradition in terms of dialectic.
Throughout the book, Spranzi compares and assesses the sources and contents of 
Aristotelian traditions; however, there are three areas which may need further elaboration 
and clarification. First, her text is thorough within the context of the Greek and Italian 
philosophers; however, she does not discuss the way Aristotelian dialectic was developed and 
modified in other European (i.e. German ars disputandi) and non-European philosophies 
(i.e. Arabic âdâb al-bahth) during the Renaissance. Second, the mention of “Aristotelian 
tradition” in the title of the book also raises the fundamental question in the history of 
philosophy: what does tradition mean? Before applying the label ‘Aristotelian’ to a particular 
area in the history of philosophy, should one have to decide whose Aristotle and whose 
Aristotelianism ought to be chosen? The reader may find this question left unanswered. 
Third, while Spranzi provides profound analysis of Aristotelian dialectic as a thorough 
reader of philosophical texts in Greek and Latin, the book fails to formulate and answer 
any specific question in the history of philosophy. The author favors a chronological-textual 
approach, looking at the various thinkers’ thoughts instead of responding to any specific 
question about their epistemological, religious, and political implications in their specific 
historical context. Nonetheless, advanced graduate students and scholars who seek a closer 
analysis of trajectories of Aristotelian dialectics, particularly within the context of the Italian 
Renaissance, will benefit from Spranzi’s work.
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